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CASES NOTED
istrative ruling5 the Bureau of Internal Revenue felt the latter to be the bet-
ter view, whether the fruit is severed from the realty or not. The Bureau's
failure to treat the unsevered crop as part of the realty raises the second
difficulty: whether "realty" should be given equal weight with the other
requirements of Section 117(j). Since a sale or exchange of property must
be characterized as a sale of real, or depreciable, property held for six months,
and then considered in the light of the Code's negative requirements, it is
obvious that all portions of the section must be given equal consideration
before the sale can be considered as a capital gain or loss. Once accepted as
of equal weight, the definition of real property must be sought in the general
law,9 since the Internal Revenue Code does not define it. The general rule,' 0
with which Florida'" is in accord, is that unsevered fruit is part of, and passes
with, the realty.
The instant case follows the general rule regarding unsevered fruit on
realty, thus supporting the "purpose for which held" interpretation of the
word "primarily." -lowever, the court reinforces its characterization of real
property, by viewing real property as a state-created right which the Federal
Government may tax. It is on this basis that the court specifically refuses
to enforce 12 I.T. 3815,' 3 and holds that a single sale of land and fruit trees
with immature, unsevered fruit is not such a sale of "property held primarily
for sale" in the ordinary course of business." There is left, however, for
future determination, the problem of whether mature, unsevered fruit, sold
as a package with land and trees, is also to be considered a single sale, 4 a
problem which could be of considerable interest to citizens of Florida.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
FOR NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff, a paying patient in defendant corporation's non-profit hospital
was injured through the negligence of nurses employed by the hospital.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages. Held, that an incorporated charity
8. I.T. 3815, 1946-2 Cums. BULL. 30. Administrative rulings are interpretations by
the Bureau or the Treasury Department of tax law in the United States Code and
Treasury Regulations. Of these rulings, only Treasury Decisions (T.D.) are binding as
precedent. Treasury Regulations, and the Instructions on the tax blanks, are the only
legally binding constructions of tax law interpreted by the Treasury Department.
9. See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1946).
10. 1 WILLISTON, LAW GOvERNING SALE OF GooDs, § 61 (Rev. ed. 1948).
11. Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946) (fruit on the trees of
homestead land went to widow as part of the realty).
12. The Commissioner may appeal to the United States Supreme Court or file a
notice of acquiescence or non-acquiescence. Further than that, the Treasury Department
is not required to adhere to other than United States Supreme Court decisions. However,
within each district, federal court decisions are precedent.
13. Supra note 8.
14. This court found that petitioner's business was that of growing fruit to maturity
and selling such fruit as distinguished from buying and selling groves. 94 F. Supp. 206.
211.
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should respond for its torts as do private individuals and business corpora-
tions. Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 45 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1950).
The general rule as to tort liability is that all persons or entities are
liable for torts committed by them or by their employees within the scope
of their employment., Charitable institutions, 2 however, have been held
to be immune from liability. The extent of the immunity and the reasons
therefor have varied among the courts in a welter of conflicting decisions.3
In some jurisdictions immunity has been held complete and absolute 4 while
in others charitable institutions have been held immune only to the extent
of their trust funds." Many courts have distinguished between strangers and
patients, allowing immunity only in case of the latter.6 . Some have held
that charitable institutions arc liable to paying patients and still others have
indicated that liability should be absolute.8 Connecticut has held charities
liable only when there has been negligence in the selection or retention of
their employees.9
The holdings in favor of immunity have been based primarily upon
four theories, to-wit; the trust fund theory, the non-applicability of respon-
deat superior to charitable institutions theory, the implied waiver theory, and
the public policy theory. The trust fund theory, which had its genesis in
this country in 1846,10 was based upon an English dictum" which had al-
ready been repudiated' 2 in England. This theory is that trust funds could
not be used for the payment of tort claims, since to do so would be to
thwart the purposes of the donor and discourage charity. The second theory
is that respondeat superior does not apply to charities since they receive no
1. J.C. Penney Co. v. McLaughlin, 137 Fla. 594, 188 So. 785 (1939); see Poutre v.
Saunders, 19 Wash. 2d 561, 143 P.2d 554, 556 (1943).
2. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Ati. 1087 (1910) (hospital)
("The fact that it receives pay for a certain class of patients detracts nothing from its
character as a purely charitable institution."); Geiver v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal
Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.AV. 463 (1928) (religious society); Pepin v, Societe St.
Jean Baptiste, 24 R.I. 550, 54 At]. 47 (1902) (non-profit benefit association).
3. See Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 226 Iowa 374, 377, 384 N.W. 186,
188 (1918).
4. Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Mo. 1949); Vebb v. Vought, 127
kan. 799, 279 Pac. 170 (1929); Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66,
126 N.E. 392 (1920).
5. Moore v. Moyle, 405 I1. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Baptist Memorial Hospital
v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S.W.2d 1088 (1940).
6. Bruce v. Central Methodist-Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951
(1907); Basabo v. Salvation Anny, 35 R.I. 22, 85 Atl. 120 (1912) (by statute).
7. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Nicholson v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
8. Mulliner v. Evangelisher Diankonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699
(1920); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H!. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939); Sheehan
v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
9. Haliburton v. General Hospital Soc'y of Connecticut, 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d
261 (1946).
10. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
11. See The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 513, 8 Eng.
Rep. 1508, 1510 (1846).
12. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686 (1866).
CASES NOTED
profit from the acts of their employees. The third theory is that one who
accepts the benefits of a charity, thereby waives his right to sue it for its
torts. The public policy theory is that it is better for the community and
the public in general that the individual bear his loss rather than that the
institution should be liable in damages.
These theories of immunity have all been subject to severe criticism.' 3
By the weight of authority14 a charity is held liable to strangers; it is held lia-
ble to beneficiaries when the institution has been negligent in the selection or
retention of its employees. Followed to its logical conclusion the trust fund
theory would permit no exceptions.'3 The trust fund should be exempt
from liability for negligence in all cases or none.19 Thus, reason the courts,
the trust fund theory loses its merit for the exceptions to the theory are in
reality denials of that doctrine.' 7 The second theory of immunity has been
discredited by decisions holding that the factor of pecuniary gain is not es-
sential to the application of the respondeat superior rule. 8 The position of
the incorporated charity appears no different from that of a Good Samaritan
who negligently injures the one he attempts to aid.19 The implied waiver
theory has been attacked as a legal fiction 20 for it is inapplicable to strangers,
infants, insane persons and one who enters a hospital while unconscious.2'
Negligent treatment, even to a needy patient, by an institution holding
itself out to give skilled service, is not charity." The public policy theory of
immunity has also been repudiated. Public policy is not static but changes
as the times and prospectives change. The hospital of today has developed
into an enornous business, the purchase of liability insurance has become
prevalent and the state has assumed part of the burden of treating the in-
digent. What may have been sound public policy when hospitals were
small and the good of society demanded their encouragement is not neces-
sarily good today. The courts holding eleemosynaries liable also argue af-
firmatively that liability fosters care,23 that no conception of justice demands
immunity of charities24 and that to deny recovery to a person injured
13. E.g., Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra note 7; see Gable v. Salvation
Army, 186 Okla. 687, 689, 100 P.2d 244,,246, rehearing denied (1940).
14. Basabo v. Salvation Army, supra note 6 (stranger); St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Wil-
liamson, 164 S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (beneficiary). See Nicholson v. Good
Samaritan Hospital, supra note 7, at 365.
15. See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, supra note 7, at 582.
16. See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra note 7, at 365.
17. See Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 51 Nev. 372, 387, 277 Pac. 798, 802
(1929).
18. Bruce v. Central Methodist-Episcopal Church, supra note 6; Basabo v. Salvation
Army, supra note 6.
19. See Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 813. (D.C. Cir. 1942).
20. See Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199, 200
(1924).
21. See Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 629, 200 S.W. 510, 512
(1918).
22. See Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, supra note 3, at 382.
23. Id. at 412.
24. See Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, supra note 8, at 29.
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through the negligence of one charity is apt to place the burden of aid upol
another charity or cause the injured to become a public charge.2"5
The court in the instant case overruled two Iowa cases which approved
of immunity20 thereby allying itself with the courts favoring liability and
furthering this trend. With the reasons for allowing immunity no longer
existent, it is not for the court but for the legislature, if they arc of the opin-
ion that public policy still demands a limitation of the liability of charitable
institutions, to grant immunity.27 It is submitted that the decision in the
instant case, in the absence of declaratory legislation, will permit holdings
by the Iowa courts in favor of the person for whom the charity of a charit-
able hospital is in reality intended-the non-paying patient.
TORTS-LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO RECOVERY
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Plaintiffs sought to recover tinder the Federal Tort Claims Act' for
damage to property resulting from dynamite blasting operations of the
United States in deepening a channel of the Mississippi River for naviga-
tional purposes. Held, in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss, that
dynamiting was part of a discretionary plan of the army engineers and within
an exception 2 to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Boyce v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
Substantially, the Federal Tort Claims Act is a waiver of governmental
immunity in tort3 restricted only by enumerated exceptions including that
exception, herein disputed, which precludes recovery against the govern-
ment for discrctionary acts.1 Liability can never be predicated upon the
abuse of such discretion," but only upon a breach of those ministerial duties
wherein no room for speculation or judgment is permitted. The apparent
difficulty is that no yardstick has ever been presented for establishing a
criterion which would clearly determine at what point it may be said that a
particular part of a discretionary plan becomes so insignificant or elementary
as to be classified "ministerial."
25. See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra note 7, at 373; 2 BoCERT-,
IRUSTS AN!) TRUSTEES, § 401.
26. Servison v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 230 Iowa 86, 296 N.W. 769 (1941);
Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939).
27. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 435 (1879); Rickbeil v. Grafton
Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247, 260 rehearing denied (1946).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946).
3. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
4. See note 2 supra; 35 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1 (1946).
5. Feres v. United States, 71 Sup. Ct. 153 (1950).
6. 56 YALE L.J. 534, 543-545 (1947).
7. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Johnson v. Langford, 270 U.S.
541 (1925); Jernigan v. Loid Rainwater Co., 117 S.W.2d 18 (Ark. 1938); State ex rel.
Hammond v. Wimberly, 196 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1941).
